Basejumper.com - archive

Sad and shocked to hear of the deaths of Ludovic Woerth (phoenix fly) and Dan Vicary (valley base gear) . I was told it was on the same wing suit flight in the Swiss valley but have no more details.Had never met either but had seen some of their proxy work and it was cutting edge. bsbd

I also heard a 3rd was involved who is still critical?

Police report http://www.police.be.ch/...ertoedlichverunfallt

and a rough google translation :

Lutschental : Two wingsuit flyer has an accident fatal

30 March 2014

On Saturday, two men are injured in an accident killed in a wingsuit flight in the community Lutschental . A third wingsuit flier was seriously injured. He was flown to the hospital by Rega

The three men sat on Saturday afternoon , 29 March 2014 , in the municipality Lutschental to her wingsuit flight. Above the area Lutschental / Hintisberg they jumped staggered out of a helicopter to land with the aim of the valley. First evidence suggests that overthrew the three men during the flight still unexplained reasons, on an alp in the field Sengg in the area.

In two of the victims , the disengaged rescue workers were able to find only death. The third wingsuit flier was seriously injured rescued and flown by the Rega to the hospital.

The fatalities are a 33 -year-old New Zealander and a
34 -year-old French national

BSBD.

The second Helicopter/Base/Proximity Fatality Incident to occur in Switzerland in @30 days time?

Deeply shocked and saddened at the news.

My most sincerest of thoughts, vibes & condolences go out to all those affected. Fly free forever, brothers.

That's correct.

Latest reports are that he is critical but stable.

Hang in there Brian. I'm not digging your letter out yet.

What's the reason for the accident? Collision in flight?

Chatted with some that were close and have been told that they took the wrong line. fuck.

Sad day for BASE. Peace be with their friends and families.

I was wondering when something like this would happen. Multi ways and close proxy flying, seems as if follow the leader could go wrong really quickly. I am so saddened to hear of this. BSBD. Sending every bit of positive vibes to Brian. Be strong buddy!

the previous incident was seemingly an intended proxy flight, but the jumper apparently lost stability shortly after exit.

edited to change the "loss of stability" instead of "never reached stability"

http://www.stuff.co.nz/...in-wingsuiting-crash

Slightly more details in the article.

Both were up there, top of the line in this game.

Photography' Ludovic Woerth

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GASFa7rkLtM

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/active/10736285/Why-wingsuit-flyers-wont-have-their-wings-clipped.html

Interview with mr. Pecnik and some more early evidence info about probable causes of this horrible accident. Its hard to believe that three highly experienced pilots flew proxy in "blind" and without scoping the line first, and then ended up too flat and impacted. But at the same time, since all three impacted, they couldnt have flown sufficently high enough to be able to make an emergency pull?

Seconded, regardless of the amount of motorcyclists that die on the roads everyday, look at Road Racing, specifically the Isle of Mann TT, a sport that is comparable with terrain flying in the skills required to do it well (although it has to be said that no one jumps in a does a 120 mph lap of the TT on their first attempt), yet since 1911, 240 racers have died there, and the skill level of those guys is extremely high and the technology has got a lot better since it started, yet it is accepted that people die there as the speeds are high and the margins for error are very small. (if for some unknown reason you have never seen this race or road racing, then look here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LU-ynRoqDEs)

It is not hard to believe that three guys could all go in at the same time, with the "trail plane" deviating slightly because he saw it coming. See here and here for pix and commentary on the 1982 US Air Force Thunderbirds 4-ship crash. Long story short, the lead plane elevator jammed and he couldn't pull up and the rest of the team followed him in because they keyed on him, not the ground. The "tail" flyer saw it coming and tried to pull up and thus impacted in a slightly different spot, ruining the symmetry of the crater.

That said, what follows is speculation based on a limited data set about the event, and the three jumpers and their past practices:

(Edited to remove said speculation per Bianco's suggestion)


44

Let's not speculate too much here, publicly. More than what the official police report said is not confirmed at the moment, or is very limited and vague at best. For the time being the evidence is being hold by the district attorney. Time will bring answers.
--------
Mathias

Interesting theory. But as Mathias said, time will show, so we should probably not speculate too much at this point. I didnt know them at all personally, but i have watched all their amazing videos over and over. It feels really sad that that it ended like this. Rest in peace... :(

Here's just a little bit of speculation then based on what we do know: they crashed in Sengg, Lütschental, after exiting from a heli (which generally precludes accurate on-slope wind awareness). A foehn wind (Lake Brienz is on the other side of the ridge) would result in a tail wind on their line. Following their presumed line on google earth down in elevation to Sengg, the line flattens out considerably. If they had a tailwind condition, it definitely would have reduced their margin for error flying in close proximity over flat terrain.

What the fuck do I know, except some basic meteorology/geography and that tailwinds cause loss of lift. It's just a theory. Hopefully we can ask Brian.

Roch posted some info on the French Forum a couple of days ago.

Google translation.

That's not true if the aircraft is in flight within the wind block. A tailwind at exit means it takes longer to start flying, in the same way that a tailwind at opening makes a parachute take longer to "open". But once you're in flight, the tailwind will only increase your groundspeed--it won't change your airspeed at all, and hence will not change the lift your wing generates.

If anyone has a current update on Brian's condition, I would appreciate a PM. Last I heard was that they were planning to discontinue the sedative to see if he woke up naturally. Has anyone heard anything beyond that?

Right, and there are no other atmospheric effects of flying on the lee side of a mountain

That is normally true, but in rapid changes of wind direction and velocity such as turbulence, wind shear etc , the "wind block" is not stable and will effect performance.

Sure. Turbulence will always have an effect. But that effect is not dependent on the overall direction of the wind--only on the gust direction of the turbulence. You're just as likely to encounter turbulence in headwinds as tailwinds or crosswinds.

I'm not sure what your point is?

There are obviously turbulence effects on all sides of any object--regardless of wind direction.

In USAF low-level tac training, we are trained to be aware of predictable updrafts and downdrafts as wind goes up or down a mountain slope.

Whether the pilot has a tailwind or a headwind, per se, may not be as important as two other factors. 1) is it a "relatively" gusty tailwind, and 2) based on the pilot's direction can you infer that the tailwind is actually a wind blowing down the slope.

If the pilot is flying downhill, and has a tailwind, you know the wind is also going to be generally descending along with its horizontal vector. And, creating sustained downdrafts in the process. In big mountains or severe weather this downdraft can readily exceed the performance capability of the aircraft. Vice versa for uphill flying. But that is not recommended in a wingsuit for other reasons.

How that info translates from a 75-ton herc to a 175 lb wingsuiter, I can't say from personal experience. But it is a fairly universal airmanship concept.

Another general concept is that if there is any wind in the mountains, there is turbulence. I don't know but I hear that doesnt mix well with wingsuits.

Like I said, that is normally true, but if there is a dramatic enough shift in direction and velocity between separate parcels of air, the aircraft can lose lift momentarily from a tailwind. Any way, that isn't likely here, just saying it is possible in some cases and you never know in the mountains with strong winds there are many channels of air moving in very different directions. With multiple layers of turbulence propagating between all those boundaries in addition to the effect of the terrain. Just read the FAA Instrument rating test question...

Colm makes some good points, and that could be a significant factor...

Did you all know that whenever the wind speed doubles, the force quadruples?

"One of the jumpers at the last moment decided not to jump because he did not feel "

i would like to hear his story and what exact feeling made him not jump. personally i had this feeling quite often and most of the times i had it, i didn´t jump especially the last years before i quit.

i believe this feeling or listening to this feeling (is it the famous inner voice?) is a big factor not only in base jumping.

a.

does anyone know or have any ideas on how Brian might have been the only one to survive? assuming he was flying tail and he saw the other two impact and then reacted him self, i would assume the only possible way he could have survived would have been him deploying and having a partial opening but the french translation says otherwise. did he just hit and was incredibly lucky?

Vincent Descols (Le Blond) posted the following on FB:

Edit - Already posted above.

same ^

Your post was a misleading oversimplification.

Tailwinds on a downslope are usually going down.

A very good explanation and analysis from one of the best and most dedicated pilots we have today. Just very sad altogether. I feel for Vincent and it must have been gutting him to watch the video. At the same time, this is the kind of video all proximity flyers should see.

I know several jumpers who I just don't see living through 2014! They are dead men flying and I saw this one was coming a long time a go.

And I am the first to admit my admiration for people who do their thing, give it their all and charge trough life in a no-holds barred way. But i would rather have them stay around and grow old then attending their early funerals.
End of emotional rant...

I think there is a point that is worth adressing from this accident report, and that is the dangers in following a leader (not to mention if the focus is filming the lead flyer). I know about several incidents and super close calls where jumpers barely made it because of line fixation and following a leader when flying. I also have friends who saved their own life by breaking away, and the last they saw of their friend was him flying to his death, cornered by terrain...

I did not say otherwise. My comment was directed toward the idea that "tailwinds cause loss of lift" which was why I quoted that text at the outset. I was not trying to discuss downdrafts or turbulence--had that been the case I would have said so.

You replied to someone who was already specifically talking about a foehn tailwind. In that context your comment was simply wrong.

If you were making a comment that ignored any of the relevant context, either from the accident or the comment you were replying to, then you should have said so.

This was posted in the comments under vincents post on facebook. I think it's a interesting question...



"Hi all,
Since Hervé's death, I'm haunted by a recurrent question that is underlined by this last carnage. I would appreciate if all of you could give me a honest opinion:

Would you try to locate your PC on a legpouch/BOC if you were just a few feet above the ground, flying too slow to lift? We trust our WS flight skills more than the pitch/opening chaos... Flying is the "comfort zone". Opening is like throwing down your ace in the hole, isn't it?
My question is not about choosing the right "window" to pitch. It's about pitching if you burned your last joker, and if you were trapped over an unexpectedly flat/long terrain? Would you guys dare to close your wings (to pitch) when you know that every mph and every foot matter?

The corollary of this question concerns (my obsessional subject) : the wingtip pouch...
How would your mind be if you knew that you can open your parachute without changing your AoA and body position, just needing to rotate your wrist and using very little brain resource...

Sorry if some of you consider my question "unappropriate" or "opportunist".
As Vincent wrote : "This drama has to be useful!!", and this page is one of the few where we can discuss this specific point.

I send you all my positive energy.
Peace and Chocolate"

Hello,

Don't you think that the main problem in WS base today is : flying too close to the ground?!!!

Shit, we've got a genius over here.

I think modifying our deployment system is not productive - BOC works, we need to look at the root cause.

As someone else pointed out - the problem is now it is "normal" and "cool" to regularly fly low over complex terrain. (Although it seems that navigation and wind conditions were more likely the causes in Switzerland)

Espen made some good observations recently:
http://www.espenfadnes.com/...oday-bold-mad-crazy/

That is the main problem and it's here to stay.

At least if you fly your line alone and without a camera, all your focus is on the flight. That is not the case for many of "the best" in the sport these days though

- Got to fly that line, got to get that shot

i'm not a genius, it was ironic.... i just try to say that we always try to find solutions, or excuses, to fly at this level, after a accident, but we have to open our eyes : that's dangerous, that's all. Fly so close shouldn't be the normal way of fly our WS, as it is shown in videos...

Sorry Charlie, but that's what the old farts said when someone got the bright idea that we should move from main-side ripcords to hand-deployed pilot chutes.

That's what the old farts said when someone said we should move from belly-band- and leg-mounted hand-deployed PCs to BOC-mounted PCs.

That's what the old farts said when Roger Nelson said first-jump students should jump squares instead of rounds.

That is what the old farts said when someone said BASE jumpers should use a line mod to compensate for the loss of line control on slider-down jumps.

And that is what old farts said when the first pin-closed BASE rig showed up on the market.

I've been parachuting for 40+ years and BASE jumping for almost 25 years, and I cannot even remember how many times someone declared that a new idea was "not productive" -- only to see that new idea become "the law of the land."

Being able to deploy without changing your body position is a brilliant idea and I fully expect that to become the "new normal" -- in part because of this incident.

All that aside, you are correct that flying too low is the root cause of most wingsuit terrain flying fatalities these days and that is something another old fart named Skratch Garrison (who, ironically enough, was so named because he'd "skratch" off loads that didn't feel right) once assessed correctly back about 1976. Back then, the cutting edge of parachuting was sequential RW at The Gulch, followed by routinely pulling at about 500 feet with their old 28-foot rounds. A dozen of them died there in a 2-year period, leading SKR to say:

"Pulling low is a rush, but it just ain't practical."

Update to now with one word change:

"Flying low is a rush, but it just ain't practical."




44

Here is Brian talking about WS in general prior to the accident. http://www.mixcloud.com/SummitCHX/flora-blathwayt-talks-wingsuiting-with-brian-drake/

http://www.mixcloud.com/...ing-with-brian-drake

Ludo was the nicest French BASE jumper I ever met. Met him in China last year at the first WWL Grand Prix. Super guy and a great flier. Goes to show, this sport has no margin for error and even the best can make a fatal mistake. I've been around a long time and have lost many friends, but when you lose jumpers of this caliber the loss seems greater somehow.

Hey Robin. You are right that the super close/low flying is what is killing our most experienced fliers. I guess it will always be a truism that in extreme sports, the real leaders that always push the boundaries of the sport into the future will always be at risk of death. It's the nature of extreme sports, especially one as extreme as proximity wing suit flying. Without this truism, we would all still be jumping round canopies. I totally agree that if you can invent a way to deploy with no change in body position, it would be a great improvement especially for the low flying jumpers who can't afford to lose any lift.

I am not sure they were proxy flying for most of this jump. They were just long, lost, and trying to make the lower valley lz. They were in the wrong place essentially and tried to make it back to the main lz :(. I think when they rounded the last corner hoping to get to a steeper area they ended up very low and slow over a long flat. As vince pointed out the last chance to pull was earlier but before they reached the blind flat. Sad they ended up in a closeout and they will be missed greatly.

Yes. But it's also one of the main attractions.

Risk is part of what we are doing. In some cases they go hand in hand. People have a right to choose to take those risks. Every one of these jumpers knew the risks and understood that they were taking them.

I have concerns about the wingtip pouch if used in an emergency (at low airspeed) after an unstable exit.

It's fairly easy to toss the PC from the BOC hard to clear the flailing mess that is an unstable jumper. I'm not clear on how the performance of the wingtip pouch would be in a similar situation.

Skratch also said:

"We jump to feel feelings--that's it, that's the whole thing."

Let's not lose sight of the fact that we take risks to gain rewards (those feelings) and that each of us has a different risk/reward analysis.

I'm not going to be trying something as amazing as those guys were doing any time soon, but that's because the rewards in my life are different, and so is my acceptable risk level. But it would be silly for me to judge them by applying my risk/reward ratio to their decisions.

The deeply personal nature of BASE and it's extreme risks and extreme rewards, are one of the major reasons that we can't make safety rules that apply to all jumpers. Everyone has to make their own rules and their own decisions to fit their own life.

Well said, and if you look closely, you will see I made no value judgment about flying low -- just because something is not practical doesn't mean you shouldn't do it... it's just not practical to do it -- as is wingsuit BASE or BASE generally if you get right down to it: For most people, the risk-reward equation is not practical.

As you say, we all make tradeoffs to feel certain feelings and, like you, while I would love to fly between the trees in my wingsuit, it is not likely that I will ever do it because, well, at this point in my life, it wouldn't be practical...

In this particular case, though, the emerging story seems to be less related to flying too low and more related to making a wrong turn and then either not recognizing the need to pull immediately or just concluding that they could make it past the flat spot. Yes, had they flown higher overall, they may have made it past the flat spot, but when you make a wrong turn everything else kinda becomes moot.


44

Not having to change body position to deploy is a fantastic idea.

I hope we see many "Violetta" wing tip PC system soon.

Tom i really do not see an issue for your "emergency deployment on exit" senario.

On another note, this is now a triple fatality. Brian was found to have very limited brain function on MRI and life support was withdrawn. Condolences to his family.

First of all, this is unbelievably tragic. Condolences all the way around.

On another note (and Tom feel free to spin this off into another topic if you think it's appropriate), this brings back the debate about how we should be viewing these incidents. I think it's getting harder and harder to say that these are sky incidents. Go take a look at the incident thread on DZ.com and you'll see immediately how unproductive that discussion is. There's no real lesson for sky jumpers there.

If we're being honest with ourselves, these are BASE incidents and should be recorded as such on the BFL.
Just my two cents, but it seems clear that the lessons learned here are BASE in nature. It walks like a duck, it quacks like a duck, it's a duck.

Thank you for the update Very Very Sad.....

Scott

 

+1

There are some key fatalities that don't make the list because they were from a helicopter. If the list is for learning then I think it is time to add them.

+2
Proxy flying is part of wingsuit base-jump. Starting from a cliff or a helicopter doesn't make a big difference (that's probably why it's called heli-BASE).

Damn. BSBD

Crap. BSBD.

RIP Fly free boys.

+3

+4

I think Proximity Flight is it's own thing at this point. It's not particularly relevant if it started from a cliff or aircraft. It's the proximity portion of the flight that is the real focus. I'm not sure that it's fair to call it either a BASE jump or a skydive.

Perhaps we need a separate Proximity Fatality List.

Damn.

I believe, you are wrong, in 2 points.

First, i do not believe, that a living person really is aware, that it could be over, for ever, within a minute, in all consequences. This is against our mind.

Second, most people are part of a community and our loved ones will doubt, if any person really has the "right" to take any risks. I think, we have the duty to care for our children and i think, this duty is far above any "right" to take an irrational risk just for our fun.

You have no right to accept the final game over for a second of joy. And any time, you look in the eyes of your child, you will know this. And it is wrong to forget this responsibility anywhere out there.

This is not related to this accident here, but a general opinion as reply to your general opinion.

I understand your sentiments and why you might think this, although I disagree on both counts:

Firstly, I am acutely aware of the fact that the entire experience will be over in a very short time - good or bad - each time I jump. In a way, I feel it is almost negligent not to think this; all eventualities should be thought through and planned for before the jump is made as far as can be done. Obviously things can and still may go wrong outside that, but at least the preparation makes the risk of that smaller. I'm also a veteran of something going wrong, having experienced a cliff strike in the valley some years back. I have made almost 150 BASE jumps since then too.

Secondly, we are all free to make our own judgement calls. The absolute level of risk taken by anyone is also often in the "eye of the beholder" too; it is almost impossible to compare as what may be reasonable for one may not be for another. In this incident, the people involved were taking a risk, yes, but their collective levels of experience, currency and planning mitigated this. As it stands, something did go wrong - suggestions of not being where they wanted/expected to be have been made. One could therefore conclude that insufficient planning had been made, but that would also be unfair. Everyone can always plan more, but there's a reasonable limit. Everyone is also fallible.

Lastly, I would assert that risk/reward is a unique ratio for each of us, and life circumstances change it. Ultimately we do these things for fun and other forms of reward; if we're not enjoying it (eg, through stress of the event) then it's no longer worth the risk. When that equation tips though is different for each of us.

Richard

Of course, this is very true

Why do I have no right to accept the final game over?

That would be a bit weird because some of them are BASE fatalities.
Maybe we could just add these fatalities to the BFL and specify the exit type (cliff, helicopter, ...)

There is a need for a proximity flying list because using helicopters as exit points is increasing and significantly contributing to fatalities. (And clearly there is a need to dissect the incidents because people keep repeating mistakes as well as make new ones.)

If you die proximity flying on a BASE jump, you go on the BASE fatality list. You also go on the new Proximity flying list.

If you exit from a helicopter you do not go on the BASE fatality list but you do go on the new Proximity flying list.

Makes sense to me. I second the motion.

There is no need for the lists to be exclusive. One accident could be on both lists.

And remember that there is nothing "official" about any of our lists anyway. They are as official (or not) as we make them.

I have been involved in investigation of several skydiving accidents in last 2 decades and experience I got from that is rather clear.


For tragedies like that in most cases there are two possible outcomes: either they remain unsolved and no definite conclusions can be made due to lack of evidence, leading to speculations and assumptions; or there are sufficient evidence or witnesses providing clear picture of the accident and enabling firm conclusions.


Here we have a case where three flyers impacted almost at the same spot on the ground, and this is telling us that something was seriously wrong.


That was terrible tragedy, but fortunately there are some evidence left behind, allowing us to draw some conclusion. So far, it is very clear that boys made at least three major mistakes:


1. Although the weather is very important factor in planning and executing proximity jumps, they have either forgot to check the weather conditions, wind in particular, or even worse, they choose to ignore wind reports (we have information that one jumper, who was part of that group, refused to jump because of weather conditions).


2. They have exited the helicopter at the wrong spot, because they did not take wind conditions into account, either because wind conditions were unknown to them, or they were ignoring weather reports.


3. Once they jumped out of the helicopter, they failed to cross the ridge at the planned point and from then on it looks like they have been constantly improvising during the flight, attempting to adjust the flight path to the (unfamiliar) terrain, and finally got surprised by flatness of the terrain.


For me, this case is very clear…

Now, we can discuss how and why they managed to get trapped in such a way...

It will be good to have that in mind for the future, and in order to draw some conclusions that may even be transferred into some kind of rules. But for me, it is irrelevant at this moment to discuss about pull system or how to glide or shall the Heli BASE be accepted in BFL or not…

After this particular accident one thing is more than clear, that when doing Heli BASE the whole mindset has to be reconsidered and subsequently changed.

Had the group been jumping particularly hard either that day or the previous days? I always wonder about the build up of mental fatigue of expedition types of trips, particularly when I read uncharacteristic words like "improvising."

I agree that a seperate section of the BFL for BASE-related fatalities from aircraft would be useful.

(Obviously not such an important issue at this stage)

BSBD

Very well put Robi.

The other thing that I can add is that I know that this was not the primary planned jump for the day. There was too much wind at the first site, which lead to this jump being chosen. Not sure how much scouting was done beforehand, but that could have definitely played a roll.

I have every right to be who I am. Where is the law that says I cant be the same person that attracted me to her or her to me just because we got family. You are so vanilla IMHO.
"Hey, my dad was a pioneer in in a new sport exploring the envelope and died and people learned and took the sport to his level. And your dad???"

One has every right to be who they are. Your post makes me angry.
who the the hell are you to tell me my rights?
If it works for you, fine. But i do say you have no right in pushing your limitations on the rest of us.
Take care,
space

Le Blond just posted another very detailed and technical analysis here: https://www.facebook.com/...99685436027/?fref=ts

Before you announce your language deficiencies, please use http://translate.google.com/#auto/en/, it will do a reasonable enough job.


Salut à tous.

J'ai essayé de rester le + factuel possible dans le post en Anglais que certains ont déjà pu lire. Les larmes sèchent et je prend calmement le temps de poursuivre l'analyse de la tragédie qui a conduit 3 amis au tapis, surtout que je devais être présent dans l'hélico si je n'avais pas travaillé...

Point d'accusatoire ici, simplement le besoin de comprendre comment une succession d'erreurs banales a fini en drame. Ce genre d'erreurs nous les commettons tous, mais rarement plusieurs à la suite. Le contexte, la météo, l'euphorie, la fatigue, le nombre de sautants, multiplie les probabilités d'erreur.

- Tout commence par un largage un peu loin de l'entrée de la ligne de vol prévue, pourtant déjà volée par 2 d'entre eux par le passé.
- çà vole pas trés vite, à plat et finesse moyenne pour des ailes de ce type (tête relevée visant l'entrée de ligne? vent Foehn pénalisant? briefing vidéo?).
- 40s de vol très haut, la ligne souhaitée à gauche restant barrée par une immense crête qu'ils ne peuvent franchir. Perte de hauteur régulière par rapport au sol, vitesse faible.
- Arrivée en bout de combe, peu d'échappatoires hormis la crête qui s'efface doucement. Passage sous la hauteur d'ouverture et virage à gauche (sans grosse proxy) dans l'espoir de récupérer + de pente.
- Visuel assez plat, aucune ressource possible car pas assez de vitesse, créneau de 3s pour ouverture très très basse après une brève rupture de pente, puis c'est l'horreur d'être 14s à 5m sol et lift max, avec très très peu d'espoir de passer vu le petit replat final avant la grosse rupture de pente...

Pourquoi les 3 d'un coup? Parce que Brian filme de telle sorte qu'il ne voit que très peut la ligne de vol... c'est çà qui le faisait tripper. Il s'est aperçu de la situation alors qu'il ne pouvait déjà plus tirer, 10s avant impact... atroçe. Ludo était un peu + haut, et s'est rendu compte de la situation très tard et juste à temps, mais il n'a saisi aucune des 2 micro opotunités qui lui était offertes (tirage très bas et mini échapatoire). La vidéo à peut être révélé des aspects impossibles à saisir en vol et en stress, donc aucun jugement, juste les faits tirés des vidéos.

Il a fallu plusieurs erreurs ou "non décision" pour en arriver là, car le largage en lui même n'est pas si grave. Qui ne s'est jamais "vaché" en Base ou en Skydive? En haute montagne, l'évaluation des plans et des distance devient délicats avec les échelles monumentales des grandes montagnes. Parmi ces erreurs:
- Le vol est irréfutablement lent, dès le départ. L'absence totale de ressource dans les dernières secondes de vol en témoigne.
- Le vent est probablement présent, même légèrement, car ils viennent de ne pas sauter sur une autre montagne à cause du Foehn.
- Il y a des posés partout avant le virage à gauche, ce n'est donc pas par peur de l'arbrissage qu'ils ne tirent pas.
- Passage sous la hauteur d'ouverture sans visuel à gauche et aucun échappatoire ailleurs.

Malgré la merde dans laquelle ils sont à ce moment, ils peuvent encore tirer durant quelques instants en espérant s'en sortir blessés mais vivants. Ils ne le feront jamais...., pas même durant les dernières longues secondes à tangenter le sol et où il est clair que çà ne passera pas.

Comme dans la plupart des derniers accidents, c'est un cumul d'erreurs, et une seule en moins aurait pu offrir une fin salutaire. Comment minimiser ces erreurs qui nous arrivent à tous, et qui nous arriveront à nouveau?
Il y a de nouvelles réponses en permanence, voici celles que j'applique en ce moment pour mes vols du caillou et d'hélico lorsque j'envisage un vol de terrain avec passage sous hauteur d'ouverture (j'insiste sur la hauteur d'ouverture, propre à chacun, qui marque pour moi le début du vol de proximité, qui ne se résume pas à tondre la pelouse)

Le largage et avant:

- échauffement musculaire (essentiel à de bonne perfs et un éventuel atterrissage difficile)
- connaissance des environs (sommets, villages, lignes électriques)
- reconnaissance à pied (ou speed-riding, parapente, avion...) des posés, lignes électriques, et passages délicats du vol.
- connaissance de l'altitude d'entrée de ligne de vol (+ 500m mini pour le largage)
- ne pas penser "argent" (30€ la minute quand même...), la hauteur c'est la sécu! 30m de + et Dan, Brian et Ludo seraient là...
- visualisation des problèmes éventuels et solutions briefées

Encore trop pensent que nous volons des lignes engagées sans analyses préliminaires. Les largages que nous avons fait la veille de l'accident, ils étaient sur-préparés. Pendant que les copains allaient ouvrir un saut dans la Bourne (si si!!) j'ai passé 2 jours chez moi comme un geek à calculer toutes les finesses alentours, à réfléchir aux erreurs que nous risquions de commettre et comment s'y préparer, utiliser des photos et vidéos pour anticiper chaque difficulté et optimiser les trajectoires en sécurité... 2 jours de travail au sol, sans parler de la préparation en vol. C'est à ce prix uniquement que nous avons voler sereinement dans des reliefs sûrement mortels sans analyse poussée.

Nos 3 compères ont changer de plans dans la journée à cause du vent, et n'ont certainement pas préparé le vol suffisamment (sinon ils ne se seraient jamais engagés bas sur un sol à 2,9 de finnesse)

le vol:

- vitesse, toujours +
- connaissance de la finesse précise de chaque section de la ligne
- évaluation du plan de plané par rapport au relief, essentielle et à maîtriser parfaitement! Il y a des techniques bien connues dans l'aviation de montagne (alignement de 3 points et analyse de l'évolution de l'angle)
- prêt à tirer rapidement, si çà part en couille çà va rarement s'améliorer...

Lorsque je m'engage dans du vol proxy (c-à-d simplement sous ma hauteur d'ouverture, et pas forcément à moins de 10m sol), il est obligatoire que je réponde sans hésitation par OUI à de très simples questions:
- vitesse suffisante?
- finesse suffisante?
- sortie de secours? (qui peut très bien être par le haut si la pente est raide)
un "peut être" est un NON! Il faut alors accepter de tirer en catastrophe, quitte a se péter les guiboles, çà sera toujours mieux qu'un impact direct avec la tête en avant.

S'écraser est une réalité dans le Base. L'instant où l'on saute démarre le compte à rebours qui fini par notre impact au sol. C'est nous qui l'arrêtons à volonté en jetant notre extracteur, ni plus ni moins. Alors mieux vaut le jeter tard que jamais.
La proxy se banalise et le sol perd sa dimension effrayante et dangereuse. Il faut garder en tête que notre discipline est un sport, qui comme tous les sports nécessite une préparation de sportif. Regardez autour de vous (ou la télé, çà marche aussi), un skieur répète tout les virages de son tracé qu'il connait déjà par coeur, le pilote de voltige avant son vol ressemble à une marionnette tant il mime les mouvement de son avion, ils s'échauffent avant l'action... Nous connaissons généralement trop peu le terrain sur lequel nous volons sans échauffement suffisant.

Dans ce crash d'hélico, si on ajoute une dose d'euphorie (vu les vols de la veille y a de quoi) et un soupçon de fatigue (même raison) dans ces situations stressantes, on arrive à des réactions inattendues, irrationnelles, même pour des pilotes chevronnés et expérimentés comme Dan, Brian et Ludo. Nul ne sait comment nous aurions réagit à leur place, et là n'est pas le sujet. Le but de ce post est de tenter de trouver une piste pour ne pas s'enfermer dans les erreurs que nous commettrons tous un jour ou l'autre.

Et puis il y a l'espoir... l'espoir que çà passe, l'espoir d'une bulle d'air montant, l'espoir de se tromper sur notre mort prochaine... C'est cet espoir qui nous fait prolonger le suspens dans les situations délicates. Car pour sauter d'une falaise, une des prérogative de caractère est la confiance en soi et l'optimisme, dont le cocktail nous aveugle souvent sur la réalité d'une situation pourrie... La leur ne fait qu'empirer de seconde en seconde, l'espoir les rapprochant doucement de la fin de leur compte à rebours. Et pourtant nous n'aurions peut être pas fait mieux. D'où l'intérêt de stopper ce genre de situation le + tôt possible, avant le saut étant l'idéal, grâce à une solide préparation.

Ce carton, à mes yeux, ne remet pas en cause le vol de terrain. Il souligne la complexité des étapes à franchir et le long travail préliminaire qui mènent à un beau survol de montagne, dont on ne voit généralement que les quelques instants les + majestueux en vidéo.

Restez humbles dans le ciel. N'oubliez pas que nous ne sommes que des humains. Eux 3 en étaient de formidables, je ne les oublierai jamais....

Soyez libre et heureux

Le Blond

+1


+1000000000000000000
This is the point!

This is really well written; never read anything like it when it comes to BASE.

complete translation from google translate.

I have to agree, even with direct translation, this is an amazingly well written and lucid account.
Robi and Vincent had some really valid points. Before we head into this summer w e should head these warnings and try live a little longer.
I have read Vincents account a number of times and it has really resonated with me. Thanks to Le Blonde for such an honest and insightful take on a tragic incident.

donald
PS: there is no such thing as a beautiful death

"Hi to all.

I tried to be as factual as possible in the + post in English that some have already been read. Tears dry and I take the time to calmly continue the analysis of the tragedy that led to the mat 3 friends , especially since I had to be present in the chopper if I had not worked ...

Point accusatory here , just need to understand how a mundane errors succession ended in tragedy. This kind of errors we commit all , but rarely several in a row. Context, the weather , euphoria , fatigue, the number of jumping , multiply the probability of error.

- It starts with a drop a little far from the entrance of the predicted flight path , yet already stolen by two of them in the past.
- Here not fly very fast, flat and finesse average wings of this type ( head up to the line input penalizing Foehn wind briefing video ? ?) .
- 40s high flight , the desired left remaining blocked by a huge ridge line they can not cross. Loss of height due to the ground , low speed.
- Arrival after combe , few loopholes except the ridge that fades slowly. Passage in the opening and turn left ( without big proxy ) in the hope of recovering + slope height.
- Visual fairly flat, no possible resource because not enough speed , niche 3s for extra low opening after a short break in slope , then this is the horror of being 5m 14s ground and lift max, with very, very little hope of passing saw the little ledge before the final big nick ...

Why three at once? Because Brian films so he can see that very line of flight ... it's here that made tripper . He realized the situation when he could no longer pull, 10s before impact ... atrocious. Ludo + was a little high , and realized the situation very late and just in time , but it has not entered any 2 micro opotunités which was offered to him (very low draw and quick escape route ) . The video can be found impossible to capture in flight and stress , so no judgment , just facts from the video aspects .

It took several errors or "no decision " to get there , because the release itself is not so bad. Who never "cow" in Base or Skydive ? In the high mountains , the assessment of plans and distance becomes difficult with the monumental scale of the great mountains . Among these errors:
- The flight is irrefutably slow from the start . The total lack of resources in the last seconds of flight demonstrated .
- The wind is probably present even slightly , because they just do not jump on another mountain because of Foehn .
- There has posed everywhere before the left turn , it is not so for fear of arbrissage they do not shoot .
- Passage in the opening without visual left no loophole and also height.

Despite the shit in which they are at this moment, they can still make for a few moments , hoping to get out injured but alive . They never will .... not even in the last seconds long tangent to the ground and where it is clear that will not happen here .

As in most recent accidents , it is a accumulation of errors , and one less could provide a beneficial purpose. How to minimize those errors that happen to us all , and we come again?
There are constantly new answers , here are the ones I apply right now for my flights of stone and when I plan a helicopter flight field with underpass opening height ( I emphasize the height openness, specific to each , which marks the beginning for me of stealing close , which is not just to mow the lawn)

And before the release :

- Muscle warm ( essential for good perfs and a potential hard landing )
- Knowledge of the area ( peaks, villages , power lines)
- Recognition walk (or speed riding , paragliding , airplane ... ) of posed , power lines, and delicate passages of flight.
- Knowledge of the input line flight altitude ( 500m + mini for dropping )
- Do not think " money " (30 € per minute anyway ... ), the height is the safety ! 30m + and Dan , Brian and Ludo would be there ...
- Visualization of possible problems and solutions briefed

Too believe that we fly committed lines without preliminary analyzes. Airdrops we did the day before the accident, they were over- prepared . While the boys were going to open a jump in the Bourne ( yes! !) I spent two days with me as a geek to calculate all the subtleties around , thinking errors that we might commit and how to prepare use photos and videos to anticipate every difficulty and optimize trajectories safe ... 2 days of ground work , not to mention the preparation in flight. It is only at this price that we fly serenely in reliefs certainly fatal without further analysis.

Our three friends have to change planes in the day because of the wind , and were certainly not prepared enough flight ( otherwise they would never have committed down on a floor of 2.9 Finnesse )

theft :

- Speed ​​, always +
- Knowledge of the precise fineness of each section of the line
- Evaluating the plan glide over the terrain , essential and proficiently ! There are well known in the aviation mountain techniques ( alignment 3 points and analysis of the evolution of the angle )
- Ready to shoot quickly , so here goes hand in testicle here rarely improve ...

When I engage in proxy flight ( ie to just under my opening height , and not necessarily within 10m ground) , it is mandatory that I answer without hesitation YES to very simple questions:
- Sufficient speed ?
- Fine enough?
- Emergency exit ? (which may very well be at the top if the slope is steep)
a "may" is a NO! It must be accepted to shoot disaster , even a pat themselves on the stump , here is always better than direct impact with the head forward.

Crashing is a reality in the Base. The moment you jump starts the countdown ended our impact on the ground. It is we who will stop at throwing our extractor, neither more nor less . So better late than never throw .
The proxy is becoming commonplace and the soil loses its frightening and dangerous dimension. Keep in mind that our discipline is a sport which, like all sports requires preparation of sports . Look around you (or TV, also works here ) , a skier repeats everything turns his route he already knows by heart, aerobatic pilot before his flight like a puppet as he mimics the movement of his aircraft they warm up before the action ... We generally know too little about the land on which we fly without adequate heating.

In this helicopter crash , if a dose of euphoria ( see flights on the eve of what was there ) and a hint of fatigue ( same reason ) in these stressful situations are added , we arrive at unexpected , irrational reactions , even for seasoned and experienced drivers like Dan , Brian and Ludo . Nobody knows how we would react in their place, and there is not the point. The purpose of this post is to try to find a track not to lock in all we will make mistakes at one time or another .

And then there was the hope ... hope that happens here , the hope of an air bubble amount , hoping to be mistaken about our impending death ... It is this hope that we actually prolong the suspense in delicate situations. Because to jump off a cliff , a prerogative of character is self-confidence and optimism , the cocktail often blinds us to the reality of a situation rotten ... The only worsened their second in second , hope gently approaching the end of its countdown. And may yet we would be no better. Hence the interest to stop this kind of situation + soon as possible before the jump is ideal, with a solid preparation .

This card , in my eyes, do not affect the flying field. It highlights the complexity of the steps and along preliminary work leading to a nice overview of mountain, which is generally seen that the + few majestic moments on video.

Stay humble in the sky. Remember that we are only human . Them 3 were great, I will never forget ....

Be free and happy

the Blonde

Not trying to be a dick or argue. And I totally get your point. But imho every kid on earth would rather say "my dad played football/baseball/whatever with me every chance possible" than that.

I never could play those types of sports. My son, dad or brothers either FWIW. :-)
Not everyone had a chance to have a childhood as some take for granted that they had. ;-)
My point was that freddy3 has no right to push his agenda of what he accepts as right on me or anyone else.
There are enough people in the world that each can do as they want or can and and “It doesn't take much to see that these problems don't add up to a hill of beans in this crazy world. Someday you'll understand that. Now, now... Here's looking at you kid.” (Not really calling you "kid", it is just a modified quote that came to mind.)
Take care,
space

I haven't seen a link to Matt Gerdes' excellent article on how to stay alive in a wingsuit. I hope that it isn't inappropriate to post a link to it, but it is some good reading:

http://www.skydivemag.com/article/wingsuit-base-myths

#1 myth really helped to all three

Hi, Bor - your crooked-smile emoticon indicates that you don't understand what I wrote, or the factors in this accident being discussed. For anyone else who has a question regarding that article: The points listed in it would be better as chapters in a book. As short summaries, you have to read carefully or you might miss it, I guess. Please refer to the discussion here, which expands on several of the points:
http://www.basejumper.com/...ase%20myths;#2972307


More importantly, in the topic being discussed in this thread, one of the gravest errors which led to this accident was a failure to fly at a speed which is appropriate (mandatory) when flying below safe opening altitudes. Read Vincent's excellent message which was copied into this thread just above here. In it, he points out (probably better than I did) the fact that if you are not flying FAST over STEEP terrain, then your "margin" is right around fucking zero. I think that is a very simple concept.

This accident was brutally tragic. I pray that we can all learn from it and actually apply the lessons to ourselves when we are out there.
Vincent's analysis is truly excellent. Because Google translate falls down in several instances, I have taken the liberty of manually translating the parts which are less literal. Any errors, and all [bracketed comments], are my own.



In Vincent’s words:

I feel the need to understand how basic errors ended in tragedy. We all make small mistakes, but rarely several in a row. In this situation a few factors such as the weather, excitement, fatigue, and the number of people flying together increased the probability of error.

[On this day, the trio was planning to fly a different line in another part of Switzerland, but were forced to cancel due to high foehn winds there (Foehn is a turbulent south-wind phenomena particular to the Alps). They moved the project to a line on a south-facing slope between Interlaken and Lauterbrunnen.]
The cascade of events begins with a bad spot. They exit the helicopter too far, and too low, to fly their intended line, even though two of the three had already flown the intended line before from a helicopter.

Perhaps due to uncertainty and the immediate realization that they cannot cross a ridgeline to access the intended line, the pace is set at an airspeed which is slower than average for the suits being flown, and at a glide which is somewhat average (possible causes: head high to find a line? Foehn wind? Pre-planned for filming?).

For the first 40 seconds of the flight, a large ridge to their left blocks access to the slope that they intended to fly. During these 40 seconds they are over relatively flat terrain, and their altitude steadily decreases as they continue at slow speed.

As the ridge slowly fades, there are few escape options besides a small pass. They turn left, hoping to find steeper terrain and an access point to the valley in which they intended to land. [At this point they are flying totally unfamiliar terrain, and only want to reach a landing zone somewhere near to that of the original plan.]


After the left turn, the trio encounters even flatter terrain. They are still flying at a low airspeed near max-glide, and therefore have no energy retained with which they could increase their glide performance. At this point they have around three seconds during which time they could in theory deploy their parachutes at an extremely low but survivable altitude. No one does. What follows is the horror of fourteen seconds of max glide, less than five meters from the ground, with basically no hope of passing the grassy fields that extend in front of them, and unable to access the steeper slope beyond.


So why did all three perish together?
One of the three, considered himself to be a specialist of close air-to-air filming, and his process was to fly just a few feet from his subject and focus on him completely, which did not allow him to see much beside the pilot he was following. He realized the severity of the situation only a few seconds before impact, too late to react. The third pilot was higher, and a little further behind, but he also was maintaining a close focus, filming the other two, and realized the situation only a moment before his two film subjects impacted, probably too late to deploy or change his flight path. He impacted just a few meters beyond the first two.

Several errors and missed decisions were necessary for them to arrive at this point, because the original bad spot did not make for a guaranteed tragedy. Many of us have made spotting errors while skydiving or BASE jumping, and in the high mountains distance and scale can be difficult to assess.

After exit, the standout mistakes are:
1. Undeniably slow airspeed, from the start. The lead pilot sets a pace that is slow, and a glide that is flat – near the max possible. This creates a total lack of potential for glide angle adjustment [they left themselves no margin].
2. The foehn wind which forced them to move locations may have been very light, but present.
3. They could have landed anywhere they wanted before making that fatal left turn into unfamiliar terrain. It was not a reluctance to land in trees that caused them to not pull earlier. [They did not want to land “out”, probably].
4. They made the left turn through the col at low altitude and without being at all familiar with the terrain, with no escape routes available as a plan B. [They hoped that it would be steep – it was not.]
5. After arriving in the col and seeing the terribly flat terrain and shitty situation ahead of them, no one deploys their parachutes. They may have been injured but probably would have lived if they had deployed in these first few seconds after the turn. No one attempts an “emergency pull” – not even in the very last seconds when it becomes clear that disaster is upon them.

As with most accidents, this was an accumulation of errors, and removing even one error from the situation could have improved the outcome. How can we minimize these errors?
There are always new answers, but here are some guidelines that I apply to any situation in which I am flying my wingsuit below a safe opening altitude. I must emphasize that any time I am flying my wingsuit near to terrain at an altitude that is unsafe to open, all of the following points become crucial. Everyone needs to recognize their own safe opening altitude, and then consider themselves to be proximity flying whenever they are below it. We are not only talking about a “mowing the lawn” type of flying.

Before Exiting:
- A physical warm-up: this is essential for performance flying, and to prepare for possible hard landings.
- Knowledge of the area: landmarks such as towns, peaks, and hazards such as power lines.
- Reconnaissance: either on foot, or by paraglider, speed-wing, airplane, etc. Carefully evaluate the landings, hazards such as power lines, and any technical flying sections.
- If exiting from an aircraft, my minimum is 500m clearance over terrain. Cost is not an issue, even at 30 EUR per minute; For a few more Euros of heli-time and altitude, Dan, Brian, and Ludo would still be here.
- Make a Plan B, and plan C! Visualize possible problems and brief each the team on possible solutions.

It is unthinkable to fly a committed line without an in-depth preliminary analysis. For the heli-drops that I did with this same team the days before, we were over-prepared. In some cases I have spent two days in front of the computer calculating glide paths, inspecting terrain using photos and google earth to identify hazards and optimize our line. Two days of ground work… not to mention the preparation for the actual flight. It is only at this price that we can calmly and confidently approach such a dangerous activity.

Our three friends were forced to change plans the morning of the jump due to the wind, and were definitely not prepared for what they encountered, or they never would have committed to flying low over terrain with a mandatory 2.9 glide. [Even a slight head-wind severely decreases l/d].

Guidelines for Flight:

- Speed! Always more speed!
- The pilot must know exactly the angle of every part of every slope he or she intends to fly over.
- You must continually evaluate the terrain in front of you, and you must be proficient at the process of calculating your glide in real time. There are well-known basic techniques to analyze your glide path (such as by aligning three points in line of sight and seeing if you are gaining or losing altitude on the target).
- Be ready to deploy immediately, at any moment. When the shit hits the fan, things almost never improve.

Any time I am flying below a safe opening altitude, whether I am low over something while in transit or proximity flying, it is mandatory that I have an immediate YES to a few simple questions:

- Do I have enough speed?
- Do I have enough glide?
- Do I have an escape route? (this could be UP, if I am flying over steep terrain)

A “maybe“, is a NO!

A NO means immediate deployment. It is always better to emergency pull, even if it means crashing without a fully open parachute, than it is to impact face first with nothing out. Impact is the reality of BASE jumping. The moment that you exit, the countdown to impact begins. We can only stop it by deploying our parachute – nothing more, nothing less. It is always better to deploy late, than never.
As Proximity Flying is becoming commonplace, the ground has begun to appear less dangerous to us. Yet it remains deadly. Our discipline is a sport which, like all sports, requires preparation. Everyone has seen athletes in other sports visualize their line: the alpine skier physically visualizes every turn of a course that he has already memorized, an acrobatic pilot puppets his hand movements for his entire routine before beginning it. And yet wingsuit pilots regularly launch themselves into a line without any of these preparations. An essential part of our warm-up should be an exact visualization of our line.


In this accident, when we add a dose of euphoria from the amazing flights in the days before, a hint of fatigue from the same previous flights, and a few stressful minor errors, we arrive at unexpected and irrational reactions, even for seasoned and experienced flyers like Dan, Brian, and Ludo. No one knows how one will react in their place, and it is pointless to imagine it. The purpose of this writing is to recognize and avoid the process of making errors in sequence.

And then there is the problem of hope. Hope that we will pass that ledge, hope that we will catch a small bubble of lifting air, hope that we’re wrong that we are about to die. It is this hope that can delay our actions in a delicate situation. Because to jump from a cliff, one must be optimistic and self-confident, and this cocktail often blinds us to the reality of a rotten situation, which only worsens with each passing second, with hope quickly running out. And maybe none of us would have done better – hence the desire to stop this type of situation as soon as possible, ideally before the jump, with a solid preparation.

This tragedy, in my opinion, was not the result of proximity flying. It highlights the complex process and the preliminary steps that are mandatory to have a scenic wingsuit flight in the mountains, of which we only see a few moments of in the videos.

Stay humble in the sky. Remember that we are only human. These three were great, and I will never forget them.

Be free and happy,

-Le Blonde (Vincent Descols)

 

Thank you pgpilot. I had read the translation a couple of times before but your translation really made it clear, thank you for doing that.

Good post. There has been some amazing footage coming out lately, but is it worth the risks, pushing so hard so often? If it were close friends of mine pushing like that all the time i'd be worried. The thirst for awesome footage has lead to some seriously bad decision making of late, not just in WS but in BASE in general. Let's live out to see the end of this year.

BSBD to the boys.

No flames, just fact.

**** happens when you trust a leader and fly as a unit.

Most of the time, good **** happens.

Every once in a great while, bad **** happens, and if bad **** happens when you trust a leader and fly as a unit, the **** tends to be really really REALLY bad.

Ludo and Brian apparently chose to trust Dan. Given what they knew of him from direct experience, this was not an unreasonable decision.

And I want to emphasize that word: decision.

It is not likely that they "blindly followed the leader to his crater;" they did it on purpose.

That was their decision.

That was their judgment.

A decision and judgment rendered by two wingsuit pilots whose names were always in or at the edges of every "who are the best guys?" discussion.

All three apparently made multiple mistakes in decisionmaking and judgment in terms of planning and executing the flight. However, deciding to trust and follow Dan was not among them.

It is certainly true that on the "average" multi-jumper terrain flight, every pilot must be responsible for his or her own safety, but these guys were not doing average flights so, with all due respect to your analysis, there is no special lesson to be learned from a "trust flight" multi-crater. Trust flights occur so infrequently that they are statistically far less than 33 percent relevant to terrain flying best practices.

The lessons here we already know:

1) Plan your dive and dive your plan.

2) If your dive strays from your plan, bail and save yourself.

3) You're never too good to not make a fatal mistake.

4) Appreciate your fellow travelers today because you may not be able to do it tomorrow.

The streets of Edwards Air Force Base are almost all named after superlative pilots who screwed the pooch on their last flight. There is neither shame nor disrepute in coming to such an end when you dance on the edge of the envelope.

44

I have heard of teams using radio communication when doing stuff like this, were these guys in direct communication with one another on this particular jump?

the report says one of them hadnt flown this jump or line before, was this one of the camera men that was 100% focused on filming his buddy?

If your dive strays from your plan, bail and save yourself- kind of hard to know if your 100% focused on filming your friend and he cant communicate this message back to you. even harder if you have never flown this line are 100% focused on filming and have no idea what looks right or wrong anyway.

My thoughts exactly; I think the poster to whom you were replying was a little harsh on the judgement of the cameramen. Decisions are made in advance for good reason, but that doesn't necessarily mean that they turn out right. Knowledge from hindsight is a wonderful thing, but unavailable at the time the decision was made.

Richard

This.

Probably we are not disagreeing in the "what to make out of it", but I think the comparison with the Thunderbird incident is not a really good one. For the record: I am not proximity flying myself (only "non-proximity" base jumping), but I fly aerobatics and I have done some formation aerobatics. That's why I comment here.

First, if a mistake has already been made once it should rather be a warning not to repeat that mistake, that is in our case: you have to aviate on your own, you are responsible for your survival, trust should never be 100% of your aviation guidance! Think on your own all the time. Keep a back door open. People make mistakes and you should keep that voice in your head that trust is good and necessary to a degree, but you should not delegate your flying decision to 100% to someone else.

Second, professional formation flying involves lots and lots of planning, preassigned flying figures and slots with no improvisation, as well as constant communication. Even with all those precautions, the Thunderbird accident occured. Meaning: Their accident is in my eyes the residual risk that remains if you have eliminated the "easily avoidable risk". That is: If you start out a formation flight without enough planning, then improvise during the flight and furthermore cannot communicate during the flight, it is a recipe for sure disaster in formation flying anyway. Residual risk does not even come into play, sort of.

Third, I personally see a difference between paid military professionals who fly formation as a show for spectators, and between our three tragically deceased brothers who died while following their passion which was not their job, and while doing video. I agree with sky12345 here: First of all, fly so as to save your own live all the time, and if it then happens to be close to your fellow proximity flyers and a rad video comes out, cool. But priorities should not be vice versa. I personally think it is really really tragic and kind of exemplary if even the video flyer who was a little bit higher and had the best chance to have an overview dies as well.

And fourth, breaking away in a tight aircraft formation can be really scary, so there is a higher psychological threshold to break away even if you have the gut feeling that the leader is not going the right way. That is in my eyes what got the Thunderbirds down. Breaking away in such a formation is dangerous in itself, so you try to avoid it. And after a certain point in the fateful loop was passed, nothing could save them anymore except for ejecting. Furthermore in formation flying: In the case where breaking away is necessary there are strict and fixed rules to follow how to break away and separate, and you have to communicate about all your movements to your leader and wing men. In proximity flying, communicating will be difficult obviously, but have there been strict and pre-discussed separation rules on this specific flight?
But here, as I understand, all three fliers could have separated with little danger anyway, right at the beginning when they chose the "wrong" flight path. And it is so tragic to read that accident report from leblonde where each of them individually did not take that chance. I would freely speculate that all three of them each had a bad feeling about the flight right from the start...why did they not listen to that voice?
Learning for future formation proximity flights could be: It seems advisable to choose flights paths which allow separation. If you have room to separate and you have the slightest doubt if your leader or you yourself are going the right way...then separate and / or pull!

The ONLY way to garintee that you will stay alive in a wing suit is to publish selfies on Facebook.

I'm sorry, but you misunderstand.

He's not saying go steep even if you can't go steep; he's saying if you can't go steep, get the fuck out of it. Either pull or bail into open airspace.

 

 

The way it was i dont think you could have had any less than three.

one of them had never flow that jump and was video for the leader (WTF) had no option but to follow to his death.
the other also with 100% focus on shooting video didnt have much chance to realise something was wrong either.
to me these guys were 100% at the mercy of the decisions of the leader and i guess its just a matter of time before the leader makes the wrong call gets sucked low.
if you want to run camera and dont want to be at the mercy of the leaders choises youde better come up with a better system of communication than they had or this type of accident will probably happen again. Oh and maybe hold off on running camera or multiways till you have the line dialled.
maybe everyone could have little flashing beacons on there helmets activated via a bite switch or something when things arnt to plan

I spoke with Ludo once about this and he said to me that when you re the videoman, if the "leader" go in, you go too...(when you film as close as Ludo did) And, when you film someone you can t be focused on your own flight. So you have to trust the guy you fly with. He knew it and choosed his teamate seriously. He was a professionnal videoman, it was his job, he wasn t doing video just for "look at me how i m amazing". Thing like this can happen, he knew it.
Maybe because of this we won t make this mistake, but be sure we will make anothers... So have fun and take care

This accident happened at the same location and same line where Episode 7 of epictvs Perfect Flight series where shot?
Ludo was really stressed out about that jump and gives the impression that he was pushed into it.

http://www.epictv.com/media/podcast/will-wingsuiters-find-perfect-flight-in-technical-lauterbrunnen-%7C-the-perfect-flight-ep-7-/265731

Accidents happens all the time and many people have died but this is accident was different.

You that guy with the agenda who posted the thread on DZ.com?

No??? "The domain dz.com is listed for sale. "

What interest do you have in it? Do jump and fly? I will attack your agenda on this site also.
Take care, It is best if you contact someone via PM rather than getting ripped in public.
space.

Dude! You really need to chill, what did i say to make you that aggressive really? I have no agenda or interest in arguing on this site. Obviously you think I'm someone else because of my first post on this site in this thread.

I don´t do base yet but i hope I will some day, is that ok? I have watched practically every proximity movie I found. You can call me a fan of the proximity flying "scene" Ludo and Dan was what you can call "Idols". Brians low flying in the ensa colouir is also well known to many people interested in extreme sports. Last year was horrible when so many died but the truth is this is the first accident I felt really sad when I heard about it. I´ve spent hours on google earth to understand what happened.

Back to my first post. That flying in the episode of epictvs show was one if not the best looking flying in 2013. I really didn't like how they made it look like Ludo was stressed and pushed, the first time I saw it, but it made Ludo look more human than many other "cool guy" people with big mouth in this sport. I have no idea if that was for real but I guess epictv want the "action" and make them look like daredevils or "epic".
You should blame epictv for making it look like he was pushed and stressed, not me. watch it again to see what I mean.

I want to enjoy watching good base and proximity flying but i don´t want people getting killed just to capture that perfect moment.
Peace.

No, I'm sorry dude but you either misunderstand the point that Vincent was making or you misunderstand the terrain they were flying over.

By making the decision to cross the ridge they absolutely were entering into a proximity flight. It doesn't matter whether it was the line they intended, it was a line low over the slope and that was always going to be the case.

What Vincent is saying is that if you cannot enter that line with a) speed and b) knowledge that you will be flying over steep terrain then do not enter the line. Fuck the intended landing area, bail out and go somewhere else.


That is exactly the point and it is exactly why Vincent's post is relevant.

 

One or 2 things you have said make sense. The rest is just emotional rant which lacks respect for our friends. You sound like you were there... that you know so much more than Le Blonde? You have seen the boys' video?

jakee... yes... exactly this:


David W

Am I the only only one who feels that this pretty much summarizes where our "sport" is heading to and what is wrong with it?

Right, so here's the thing: errors are cumulative. You said yourself the overall missing margin was very small - so even if they'd made every other mistake but had been able to enter the terrain with more speed, they may have got away with it. Because they didn't, they had nothing left to use to try and correct the other errors.


I don't see how you can possibly think that intentionally entering a line with much less speed than you could have had is good, and will not affect the options you will have later in flight. I seriously cannot see your logic there.


So what? The only way that is a relevant point is if trying to land where you want to land is more important than not dying on the way.

100% agree with your point of view

I don't know if you read everything, but you have people with hundreds of wingsuit BASEs that don't agree on what could have happen for this accident.

And you come here with your hundred's video view on utube and your Google earth theory and try to explain to them what's happen ! no, really !!! I can't believe you are a real human !!!!!

What I really think is that you'd better go wanking viewing hundred's of Youporn videos, you probably can have better theory on what's happen because it may be something you've already done before !

When "they" see, "they" believe and develop expert opinions, which we all know are like ass holes....... everyone has one.
Take a look at Politicians.

+1

Checking basejumper.com this morning and reading the thread about a recent FJC at the Perrine and seeing trumtrum's post makes me realize that whuffos really can never understand the level of skill it takes to be at the top of a sport that requires inordinate amounts of training and good judgement just to stay alive. I guess it's like saying," I'm going to the climbing gym to learn to climb,.. because I want to Free solo El Cap,.. because I saw a video,.. and it looks like a cool thing to do.".....?

The innovators in the sport are dying pushing the envelope, and the lemmings will die doing what lemmings do,... Damn!!!

... actually we need to be thankful to Trumtrum as he gave the community right view for whom BASE community work so often beyond common sense.
Reading his post , I felt like to be the part of the video game . if not now I don't know when will be the time to reset the way of thinking and get more margin on every flight.
WS can not go up, especially in the moment whey you may need that.

as far as the 3 x fatality goes.
heaving info I was missing , all is very clear.
Bad spot is number one error. So big error that after exit guys were nowhere . This was not distance flight nor distance line ( as for distance no jumper set the traps and go with the plan in ''let see'' mode. )
It was not proximity either as they simply did not flew proximity at all. They flew the only line they thought will be OK for getting back home .... and it was not OK.

No need to discuss about glide , speed , warm arms , cold arms.... Discussing may go in to one VERY important direction - SPOTTING!!!
The Spotting - parachuting / skydiving routine which does not exist any more in skydiving and people have no place to train this any more... this was the killer on this jump for our three great guys

110% agree.

 

Indeed, it all did start with a bad spot because a bad spot instantly destroys the dive plan.

And yes, these days even skydivers with thousands of jumps don't know how to spot well any more, and most especially they don't know the Jedi spotting tricks that are critical to figuring out where exactly you are over the ground.

And then, of course, what are the uppers at the various MSL altitudes, and then how are those uppers affected by the terrain over which they are flying, etc etc etc.

Having said all of that, it's important to understand that if you spot badly on a mountain flight, you need to bail fast because unless you have an obvious and KNOWN out from the bad spot, things are only going to get worse and your options will become increasingly limited as time goes on.

You simply cannot think, "Oh, it was a bad spot but I think I'll be all right."

You must think: "Bad spot. BAIL!"

A bad spot on a mountain flight is like a spinning malfunction on a small parachute: It may clear before you're too low to cut away -- but what if it doesn't? Better to chop when you can and wonder if you could have cleared them than take it into the death zone and know you can't.

Or think a bad launch from the cliff where you get flying much lower than the dive plan calls for.

You simply cannot think, "Oh, it was a low start but I think I'll be all right."

You must think: "Low start. BAIL!"

Jeb did it right at Tianmen in 2011. There he was, on live TV being watched by 500 million people, literally hundreds of people involved in the production of the event, and thousands of spectators on site to watch -- and a narrow window in which he could do the jump before the Chinese military shut down the airspace.

And then he spotted badly and within seconds knew he was too long to fly the route he needed to fly.

So he bailed, and by bailing he almost blew the event that was a year in the planning and would have made everyone look bad and killed the chances of the WWL to be born and yet he didn't hesitate for a moment to bail because the bad spot meant he could no longer dive his plan.

In this case, the guys did not bail as soon as they realized they had a bad spot and that is the very serious, singular and most important difference between aircraft- and cliff-launched mountain flying:

The terrain angles and relationships are STATIC in the latter and DYNAMIC in the former -- and that's why the default procedure on a bad spot should be an immediate bail: a bad spot changes everything you planned your dive on.

Robert has it exactly right: All the discussion on this entire thread can be boiled down to one thing: It started with a bad spot and went downhill from there.

Thus do I add this to my earlier post about lessons learned:

Have a bad-spot bail procedure hard-wired into your brain before you step into the aircraft because you are NOT making a BASE jump.

44

P.S. No disrespect of the guys intended or implied by pointing to Jeb's better handling of his bad spot. As I also said in my previous post, there is neither shame nor disrepute in screwing the pooch on your last flight. Happens all the time to the very best among us in every death-and-danger discipline there is. The point of the comparison is to move us forward toward a "best practices" procedure for bad-spot launches on mountain flights.

That is right on target and thus, embedded in your histrionics, you are saying exactly what Robert and I are saying here because bad spots are the leading cause of Get-It-Home-itis.

But your "99.999% of time its not a big deal" is, to use your favorite descriptor, irrelevant, because 99.99 percent of the time those bad spot did not occur on mountain wingsuit flights -- they occurred at parachute centers, where there are generally lots of safe outs for a bad spot.

"99.999% of time its not a big deal" to have line twists on a skydive, but on a BASE jump 99.999 percent of the time they are a big deal.

Likewise, a bad spot on a mountain wingsuit flight is a big deal almost every time.

And while it's nice to talk about "root causes," you use the term inappropriately. In this case:

1)a bad spot is the technical cause of this triple fatality,

2) the lack of a default bad-spot-bail procedure is a higher-order technical cause, and

3) the fact that a bad spot changes everything about the terrain angles and relationships is the root cause.

44

Have you seen the video, youre pretty confident as to what happened.

You really like to read what you wrote do you?!
For the change read carefully what others wrote too.
You writing so much that some serious writer would be very envy on you but you say very little.

Something that is being left out of Le Blond's analysis , is that I'm pretty sure he is referring to ground speed from the GPS data, so the relevance to "slow speed" is not about airspeed to fly for terrain or glide, but that headwinds were reducing ground speed and the distance travelled even though they were at max glide.

Just another link in the chain of details....

I did not try to explain to anyone what´s happen! You missed my point.

..again sky 12345,

Guys jumped out at the wrong place for the jump they have been planning.
We do not know who took the decision about executing the position from were they left the heli........ but , you know this as you know who is best lemmings among them.

All above is valid if what we assume about their planning is correct , but, you know 100% accurately what was the plan they been going for.

They jumped in the way that the leader of formation was convinced that all is OK and others too.., but, you know how stupid they are as you can't make wrong judgment.

Second jumper did not know the place so he trusted experienced guy and was following him. Very common and expected routine , again , accept for you , as you know always what should be done

Third guy knew the terrain and followed the first two as well, but , for you he is another lemming, missile ( all you know is that hi was the second flyer in the team , but that is wrong as he was the last one out. but you know better anyway )

The confidence that all going OK was with them till the moment they finish the left turn - for you hearing the story , you know that they should open the canopies - wow - pure wisdom.


The whole plan simply collapsed from the beginning but this is what WE know seeing the jump.
They did not know that, as they trusted their judgment , as if they would know they would open their parachutes and land - simple.
The guys simply did the judgment error and this happens in aviation. Why is so hard for you to accept that fact ?!

Calling them lemmings , idiots , stupid is extremely disrespectful and lame - but you like this obviously.
Whole your acting is like you know all things in this world and like you are immune on any mistake.
As I said , I guess if happened , you will die in the smart way for sure as you simply know things. This way you will be the first in the history of aviation achieving this - bravo in advance if I may ?!

Your whole post is like advertising of your ultimate smartness.

Boys died as they did mistake. Live with this and respect them despite of the mistake they did. this is really minimum you can do.
This is how people die , mostly doing mistake and especially in aviation there is no smart mistake .

 

sky12345 you are thick-headed and long winded and you need to have more respect for those who have more experience and more information than you.

Get off the computer and go fuck yourself

+1

but if they had been familiar with the terrain, would they still have crossed the ridge on the left and have tried to outfly the slope below ?

Thank you for saying what were all thinking

Are you new to this sport? Its like the most selfish thing you can do, and there are people who have the mindset like Ludo about camera flying. You have a picture of jeb as your profile, and youre still shocked by people who accept the potential of death so readily? Perhaps this is not the sport for you.

+2

Does anyone have a video of this line being flown successfully? I'm trying to visualize exactly what went wrong.

This line can not be flown successfully, as explained before in this thread they exited at a wrong spot.
The line they wanted to fly is called "Fuck Yeah Line" and you can find it in Jokkes Sommers Deam Line Vid:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GASFa7rkLtM

At 3.14 you see the entry to the line but they where to low so they continued in the valley they are in at 3.14

Thank you Mikki, I have a much better understanding of what happened now. I get that the line they took could not be flown successfully, I should have said 'intended line' in my original post.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982_Thunderbirds_Indian_Springs_Diamond_Crash

Mistakes happen, even to the best. To make "shoulda coulda woulda" statements is naive. Not to be cliche but these guys LOVED doing what they did, and I feel fortunate that they took the effort to share their flights with all of us.

In life people trust other people with their lives. I have trusted surgeons, airline pilots, climbing partners etc... This trust comes from respect. I respect surgeons and pilots because of their selection and training, even tho I don't know them personally. I choose climbing partners because of their experience and personality and then trust them to hold my falls. Ludo and Brian chose to trust Dan.

Dan must have made an error of judgement but I'm certainly not going to judge him over that - I've made many in my life, some have hurt physically (hence my need to trust surgeons!), others have hurt psychologically (hence my need for a divorce lawyer!), none have had as serious conséquences as in this incident, but I'm fully aware that one day it might happen.

Sky12...etc actually has a valid point to make, but he is such a disrespectful and arrogant wanker that everybody focuses on this. Respectfully put, he is saying that people who trust each other, doing an activity together, have a tendency to make poorer décisions than if on their own.

This is completely natural because each one says to themselves "This situation must be ok because Doodah has not reacted, so he must think it's ok and he's highly experienced and knows his shit." Problem is that Doodah is thinking the same thing about you.

I am a mountain guide and totally recognise this dynamic. I make much better decisions when leading a group of clients on my own than when out climbing or skiing with colleagues (recipe for disaster!). Climbing/skiing scenarios however generally provide opportunity for reflection and communication whereas flying down a hillside at 200km/h doesn't. I can totally see how 3 wingsuiters could get sucked into a situation like that and the fact that Skyman thinks he's smart enough for it never to happen to him might just be a contributing factor to him doing it one day!

So skywanker, please reign in your bile and accept that to err is human, to trust people (even with your life) is human, that flying down mountains with friends you trust must be one of the most beautiful things that this planet can offer, and that this accident is just simply the most tragic episode in the history of this sport.

And I hope everybody else that participates in this activity will now be even more aware of the risks involved in flying with friends, close to the ground and trying to film like Dan, Ludo and Brian were doing. This would be their finest memorial. I know Ludo was fully aware of the risks he was taking but I doubt he would have been fulfilled living his life in any other way.

Edited to make paragraphs coz it hurt the eyes!

Thank you brother.

+1000

What you said is remarkably similar to some one on the DZ.com site. Same lack of profile, New profile and first post.
With further investigation. It seems that you may not be the same poster.
My apologies if my aggression is misdirected.
Tke care,
space

I will not talk about the fly itself, but about the reason they fly this day. They fly during a foehn day, BECAUSE OF THEIR FUCKING VIDEO FOR EPIC TV . Nobody talk about that....
When a heroin dealer is pointed as a killer, we should do the same for that big big shit that is epic tv . They already killed last year, they killed again this year, they continue to put some ridiculous videos with titles that make me vomit , they just care on making $$$$ . They are(as far as i know, and i can be wrong) "bet-safe ". So cannot they bet to someone else please!!! Do we still continue to accept to be the prostitute of big brand that doesnt know nothing on basejump??? I am not talking about sponsor, they help to realize great stuff, but when petzl,mammut, PF, APEX , ETC ETC, are sponsoring somebody it looks logic. A base/mountain brand have a place for it , but i will never fucking jump for someone to make money on my ass!!
When we all started jumping do we ever think about the way it took now?? NO !!!! We were thinking on charging the casttle with friends. Now its all about being famous.
I vomit the epic tv, the jeb corliss starsystem, the redbull domination etc ....
And yes i jump because i love it i love this activity i love my team mates etc . I don t care how much view my poor little video make on utube, as soon as my bro laught while looking it. I share them freely cause i want to share good times. Not to earn money. The day money went into base, it lost his first spirit.
Go fuck yourself e-shit tv .
Pierre Bureau.

I don't think epic tv is related to betsafe...
And I think Foehn was a minor issue that day. In my opinion ultimately the jumper himself is responsible for his actions and we should not should blame a sponsor, youtube or epic tv if something goes wrong...

But I agree, the whole epic tv has brought a lot of negativity to our "sport". Unfortunately many of the existing jumpers are a lot about “me, me, me” and/or try to get a couple of bucks out of it to support their live style. And a lot of the new jumpers only get into the sport because of the rad vids they see. A company like epic tv takes advantage from this. They get almost for free footage of people doing stunts with a high potential for fatal outcome. And then they sell it as lowest, most extreme, most hardcore flight, bla bla bla…

I’m sure they (epic tv) are a bit sad if someone goes in but in reality they don’t give shit as long as the can get footage from over motivated jumpers who want to get famous. Even though the jumpers only get famous in the community, in the real world they are looked at dare devils without much brain, modern gladiators who perform to entertain the youtube and epic tv consumers with a possible deadly outcome, jumpers are still willing to put their live in danger for a couple of clicks…

Long word, short message: Epic TV only gives us the platform. We decide if we use it or not.

And I know that a lot of my friends did or do filming for epic tv, please know this rant is not directed at you (yes it is)

+1. Proportioning blame after the fact is unreasonable. They bought their tickets, they knew what they were potentially getting into and they jumped, no one pushed them off. They ran out of air, period. Tragedy, the world moves on.

Chapeau

I have a little different take on this, and it centers on the notion that what we have here are some procedure problems to be solved, not moral failures to be condemned.

I have already talked about the importance of building a bad-spot procedure onto the front end of your flight planning if you are launching from an aircraft instead of a rock.

The next procedure areas needing attention are sponsored flights and "Get-the-shot-itis" (GTSI).

These are technical issues that require additional pre-flight procedural planning in exactly the same way that jumping from an aircraft instead of a rock requires additional pre-flight procedural planning.

For the most part, we have pre-flight planning for currency, suit familiarity, flight line familiarity, weather, wind, clothing, fatigue, rig inspection, etc etc. We have built consideration of those elements into our routine flight planning.

We have not yet done the same thing with bad spots and the influence of sponsors and GTSI -- and we should.

Pierre, you are of course correct that sponsors and GTSI are contributing factors to several wingsuiting deaths. The same thing has been happening for 30 years in the "real" film business, too, where skydivers periodically die because they they didn't factor in a pushy director or deteriorating conditions or their own zeal to get the job done when making their pre-jump risk calculations.

Two examples:

1) Skysurfer Rob Harris died in 1995 because of that. Jumping a 3-parachute rig to do deliberate cutaways and still have two parachutes left. Ceiling dropped, director wanted one more shot, Rob said, "I can handle it" even though the lower ceiling eliminated all of his safety margin -- and then something snaggled on his rig and he went in at reserve line stretch.

2) In 2002, Harry O'Connor died making "XXX" when he said he could "get closer" to a bridge before cutting away from his parasail towed behind a boat. He made a little mistake in cutting away that delayed his release by half a second - and hit the bridge.

In both cases, GTSI and sponsorship (in the form of being hired) contributed to their deaths, and the same assertion can be made about several of the wingsuiting-during-film-production fatalities of the past few years.

So we need to include what for now I will call a "sponsorship/GTSI reality check" in our pre-flight planning - and that reality check will basically be to ask yourself and your companions -- out loud and in detail:

"Would I do this jump if I wasn't getting paid and/or trying to get the most rad shot ever?"

If you honestly answer "no," then carry on with the rest of your pre-flight planning.

If you honestly answer "yes" to either or both questions, then you have taken the first step toward increasing your survival chances because at least now you recognize that you are in fact partly influenced by those factors. At that point, you again and out loud ask yourself and your companions:

"Why would I not do this flight if I wasn't getting paid and/or trying to get the most rad shot ever?"

List your reasons, then ask yourself and your companions:

"Can I safely ignore each of these reasons to make this flight because I am getting paid and/or trying to get the most rad shot ever?"

If you can answer "yes" to each and every one of those reasons, then carry on; you are good to go.

If you answer "no" or "maybe" to any single one of those reasons, then you should stand down -- and stand firm with your sponsors, most of whom will gladly accept your stand-down decision because they really don't want anyone to die on their dime.

Obviously, this is just a suggested outline for a pre-flight sponsorship/GTSI reality check procedure, but the idea is that sponsorship and GTSI do in fact increase risk and thus they must be factored into your pre-flight planning and procedure just like any other risk factor.

To repeat: Sponsorship/GTSI risks are technical problems to be solved, not moral failures to be condemned. There is absolutely nothing wrong with making money from your flying, or becoming famous through it, and most definitely nothing wrong with inspiring the timid and groundbound masses with the daring and beautiful flights you choose to share with the world, not just with your airborne brothers.

But if you're going to do it, you need to build procedures into your pre-flight planning that address these additional risk factors.

44

This goes in to endless discussion while the solution is fairly simple
Filming or not filming - TAKE THE BIGGER MARGIN - Simple
To execute the line at no margin is possible but mistakes happened mostly as human eye does not see all terrain perfect ( shade , snow, fog , light issues ) and in combination with the speed needed for brain to process info and get back to body to start reaction is quite long process.

Take bigger margin and there will be less discussion like this.
Competition against the earth ( low pass ) is the battle any pilot can not win.... so remember this and enjoy flying.

yes, "take the bigger margin" is very simple -- just like "have fun, don't die."

But sponsorship-GTSI intrudes on this "simple" maxim and must be dealt with procedurally to make sure you aren't cheating yourself on your pre-flight planning.

That is because when money and fame are on the line the human mind and soul, just like the human eye, "does not see all terrain factors perfect (shade, snow, fog, light issues)" and then, in combination with the long process "needed for brain to process info and get back to body to start reaction," we end up with situations where people die in part because of the sponsorship-GTSI influence.

Thus the trick is getting to that "simple" conclusion, and the procedure I outline above is a way to reliably and accurately get to a conclusion that, on a given jump, there is no "bigger margin" so you need to stand down no matter how much the sponsor/GTSI factors may push you to launch.

The bottom line is that all real pilots have pre-flight checklists that they use religiously, no matter how many hours they have, no matter how many times they have flown a given aircraft. It's not enough to say "don't crash the plane" or "leave yourself an out;" you need to have a checklist and procedure list so that you don't leave anything out of your planning no matter how good you think you are.

Sorry to add even more words to this already-endless discussion, but, again, there are some technical problems to be solved that our current pre-flight planning procedures are not adequately addressing -- and it really doesn't take that much to fix them.

Want proof? Check out the US wingsuiter tail strikes between 2012 and 2014... there was a huge bunch of them that threatened US skydiving generally because of the insurance issues and wingsuit skydiving specifically for the same reason.

Suddenly there was a big push in the US to "regulate" wingsuiting with instructor ratings and qualifications, etc etc ad nauseam, which would have made a huge effing mess and, what was worse, was "a solution in search of a problem."

After consulting with various people, I recommended that DZs adopt a "one-second rule" for wingsuiters (keep your wings closed for one second) AND post signs next to the door reminding people to do this.

The signs went up immediately and my "one-second" recommendation was modified to three seconds because most people count too fast, but that minor addition in pre-flight procedure essentially ended tail strikes overnight.

So the big takeaway here is that minor changes and improvements in pre-flight procedures can have huge effects in reducing carnage.

A bad-spot procedure may have saved Dan, Ludo and Brian.

A sponsor-GTSI procedure may have saved several deaths last year.

And the reason goes right to your "simple" suggestion: If you use these procedures, you are more likely to TAKE THE BIGGER MARGIN -- which may in fact mean taking the biggest margin of all, which is not making that particular flight at that particular time.

Simple.

44

"take the bigger margin" is very simple -- just like "have fun, don't die."

If that is the same saying for You - than you really do not understand why I wrote this here Robin.

I am not talking about flyers who run for fame ( fame ??? ) through YT, Septic TV, RB or whatever.. This is their choice.
I am telling this to those who are about to take the path tomorrow and continue flying.

I always say:
Take care and do small steps as nobody care what you do, regardless of how great you do!
This is beside "take the bigger margin", the biggest true.
Nobody cares!

PS. Try to make the line without mentioning the money !
The sentences will look much nicer too.. less oriented and more wrapped with passion & love for flying and jumping.

PS. Guys did the check list , they were not idiots but to die is very easy when things get together in chain and start work against you.
Very little that jump had with terrain flying and ranting about what must be done is pointless here too.

We basically agree here, Robi; the differences are more semantic than real, and due to a difference in focus.

"Have fun, don't die" really is the same as "take the bigger margin."

How do you have fun but not die?

Take the bigger margin.

Simple.

But a lot of analysis and pre-flight planning is required to get to that point.

I want to make clear that I am not speaking specifically about this incident, but how in the future this incident can point us to a better pre-flight planning procedure that incorporates elements that aren't "standard."

And far from "ranting about what must be done," I am trying to take from the endless rants on this thread some elements that can make a difference in the future for everyone.

The bottom line is that we have more and more people with less and less total parachuting experience doing more and more radical flying, either for themselves, their "brothers" or for LookAtMeTUBE.

What I'm saying is: It doesn't matter what their motivation is, these same procedures have value in helping them figure how to take the bigger margin -- and to assess whether for a given jump at a given time there actually is a bigger margin to take.

And while in a perfect world we would never do things "for the money" but instead always focus on the "passion and love and beauty" of it all, the real world does not work that way and thus we have to act accordingly and put checks and balances on ourselves so we don't go for a line with too little margin.

And of course the guys were not idiots or negligent in anything they did; they made mistakes and those mistakes killed them. That's the way life is when you dance on the edge of the envelope.

That is why I am not ranting in any way, shape or form here, Robi... I am looking at some way to make productive use of the blood that was spilled because, as Al Frisby famously said: "I hate to see a death go to waste."

I only knew Ludo, and him not very well, but I would guess that if they could talk to us from the grave they too would have some ideas for others -- regardless of their skill, motivation and sponsorship -- about what to do and what not to do in terms of pre-flight planning and procedures.

One final note, Robi: You are among the most experienced terrain flyers in the world, both in terms of quantity, quality and longevity. You have seen and done so much more than almost all of us, and so, sometimes, the very depth and breadth of your knowledge and experience makes it harder for you to see some of the basic building blocks of process and procedure that are critically important for people with much less experience and knowledge than you.

I have the same problem with snow skiing. I started skiing when I was 9 and so many basics about skiing are so ingrained and instinctive for me that I am not good at training complete novices, so I always tell them to take a half-day lesson from a current instructor to get the basics I can no longer teach because it's so second nature to me.

Anyway, we are on the same page here, just using different words and focusing on different things. Hopefully, our exchange (and everything else on this thread) will be helpful in getting people to think a little more about what they're going to do before they actually do it so that they can in fact always take the bigger margin.

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YouTube, EpicTV, Vimeo... they all play a part in the last couple of years carnage. But it's all up to us to decide how much we want to push it. It's up to us to take the decisions.

10 years ago me and my good friends PerFlare and Martin did a BASE/skydiving stunt for Tomb Raider 2. We jumped wingsuits that was top-of-the-line at that time, BirdMan Skyflyers. Since this (obviously) was a multi-million dollar production it would have been very easy to get sucked in to a "pleasing-mode" doing whatever the director asked for. We choose not to and that probably saved our lives.

First incident happened when we did some training jumps in Spain. We where jumping our BASE gear and Skyflyers from a Cessna 206. On this particular jump the cloud ceiling was on 150m. We didn't use altimiters since we wanted to jump with the same gear as we would during the filmed jumps in Hong Kong. Being the "hardcore" BASE jumpers we were we decided to pull when we passed the ceiling. The flight went well, we flew above the clouds, but when we came closer to the clouds (without any sight of the ground) I got this bad feeling. I pulled. Later Per and Martin told they had the same bad feeling and pulled as well. I first saw the ground 5 seconds before landing. This could have easily become a triple fatality if we hadn't followed our gut feelings.

The second time was during the actual filming in Hong Kong. The stuntcoordinator asked if I could fly on my back filming Per and Martin. I just said no. Again, in a setting like this, big... REALLY big(!) movie production, A-team stunt crew, Angelina Jolie ..... it would have been so easy to say yes. But, I thought it was a really bad idea flying on my back with the BASE pouch (long exposed bridle), 7 kg film camera on my head, 14 more kg on my belly (not counting the fat!), a wingsuit that wasn't built for backflying and only a few hundred meters above the skyscrapers. It was my decision to take and I took it. Screw the possibly EPIC shot.

One thing that in our case helped a lot, and kind of surprised us, was what the stuntcoordinator said during a briefing of the team before shooting a single frame. "Let's be safe. This is only a movie. It's not worth dying for.". I'm not sure if EpicTV would say the same.

In the end, the decision is ours. No one else's.

/Micke

If it is really that simple then why is Robin's posts always so fucking long ;-)

Hi Micke!

What perfect examples of my Post #146 "sponsorship/GTSI reality check" idea: one case where you didn't employ it and it almost went really bad; one where you did employ it and it was all good.

Most amazing part? Simultaneous intuitive decision to pull. Crazy impressive and a testament to old school flying where you think more about what you're doing than what it's going to look like on LookAtMeTUBE.

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Not always, mate...


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